enigma
04-27-2006, 04:50 PM
Long post alert
Currently reading through a book on the subject.
Currently the book has stated several things which all lead to the downfall of France in 1940.
Allies
For a 20 year period before the war, the French attempted to build a grand alliance ala the one before World War One.
To attempt to find a counterweight in Eastern Europe to Germany they tried to construct alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Italy, the Soviet Union and Turkey.
Trying to ally Poland and the Czechs together, but they would do that because they where at each others throats over border issues.
Attempt to get Turkey to be the policeman of the Balkans but never got them into a military alliance.
Attempted to get Italy on board like in World War 1, but Italy’s attack on Ethiopia brought this to a close, there attack on Albania ended any hope.
Talks with the Soviet Union where stalled as the Poles would not let the Soviets cross there border to attack the Germans (the Poles and Soviets had only recently been at war with each other) and in the end talks where to slow and the Soviets signed a deal with the Germans.
In the end, after 20 years of talks, deals and trying to form a grand alliance to combat Germany ... Poland was all what left. The French hoped they would hold out at least 6 months to give the French and British time to mobilise fully ... this never happened.
The Belgium’s left the alliance in the early 30s and declared neutrality, which screwed up French war plans a tad
War Plans
There was several plans the French High Command came up with:
The 3 plans were:
To move up to the Albert Canal, in Belgium, dig in and await the German attack. The Canal proving to be a tough nut to cross.
This plan would require the Belgium’s to invite the French (and the British) into Belgium.
This didn’t happen.
E Plan – To defend a line along the River Scheldt, (called Escaut in French) through Ghent to Antwerp. This plan was favoured by the French military as easier to defend because of the River
D Plan – To defend a line from the French border, along the Meuse River to Namur, then along the Dyle River to Antwerp. (the Dyle being less of an obstacle then the Scheldt, but gave the possibility of linking up with the Belgiums as they fell back from the Albert Canal)
D- Plan was the option which was in the end taken, it was slightly modified, The French 7th Army advancing on left of the allied forces would swing north and join up with the Dutch in southern Holland.
Any of these plans however left a dangerously large gap between the Maginot Line and the main allied force.
Covering this gap was the French 2nd Army, from what ive read most of its units where grade “B” reserve divisions – reservists and old men. The best units this army had, the mobile cavalry divisions, were sent forward, into the Ardennes to slow any German forces heading there way so that the men of 2nd army could have longer to prepare and dig in.
Commanders
From what ive read so far, there was far too much in fighting and distrust of each other for the chain of command to effective.
Eg tussling for the top spot
On top of that we have for example the commander of 2nd army being too complacent about his army and himself … not wanting to make a fuss.
The guy who was put in overall command of 1st, 7th, 9th Armies and the BEF not being able to communicate probably, not sending orders etc
Where am up to know, it states that the BEF and the Belgium troops went for 2 days without orders as this commander was unable to think what to do.
The British liaison office at this command post states he saw the French commanders crying and unable to work effectively.
It seems in the end, General Ironside had to be sent over to sort this command out and straighten things up.
Havnt finished this section of the book so there is probably a lot more to go on the commanders (all levels) actions.
Other
As most are aware of, French military doctrine at the time, which was improving though, stated that the tanks where to support the infantry and so there was not a great deal of them together to act as a tank brigade or division to strike back.
When this was done, De Gaulle assembled a tank force to counterattack, the lack of training for co-operation etc led them to defeat after they inflicted some damage.
The French command was also weary of mining the Rhine, striking bridges etc in Germany or the bombing of the German Industrial centre as it may cause a backlash upon them. Thus they hindered any attacks which could have been made to give the allies a better chance via these bombings.
There was a lot of infighting, pre war and during the early years between the British and the French. Distrust, separate agendas etc for example, the French where connived the British where waiting for the first chance they could to run off to the channel ports and evac.
When they were informed that British troops were going to pull out of southern Norway, the French kicked up a fuss and put this off to the defeatist … running off to the nearest port and home attitude and begged the British to hold off for a while longer.
As anyone got any information which could be added to the above sections to improve them etc, more info on tactics, strategy, commanders etc please post and add them.
The What If
After the ‘history lesson’ I think this brings us to the possible ‘What If’s’
If the French had been able to form a ‘Grand Alliance’ would have the war ended sooner? Would have Germany trounced all over them at any rate?
Would have better commanders and the possible strict use of the E plan (more of a defence of the French border then attempt to save as much of Belgium as possible plan) helped any better?
With Manstein devising a plan to go through the Ardennes and behind the French, Belgium and British positions … would have better commanders, strategy, tactics etc have been able to stop the Germans anyway?
Would have a man in charge of 2nd Army who would have been after more equipment, trained his troopers more, got them to prepare more etc have been able to stop the Panzer divisions?
Would have mining the Rhine and bombing the Rhineland have helped early war to slow the Germans down?
Or the more important question,
Was France in 1940 saveable?
Currently reading through a book on the subject.
Currently the book has stated several things which all lead to the downfall of France in 1940.
Allies
For a 20 year period before the war, the French attempted to build a grand alliance ala the one before World War One.
To attempt to find a counterweight in Eastern Europe to Germany they tried to construct alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Italy, the Soviet Union and Turkey.
Trying to ally Poland and the Czechs together, but they would do that because they where at each others throats over border issues.
Attempt to get Turkey to be the policeman of the Balkans but never got them into a military alliance.
Attempted to get Italy on board like in World War 1, but Italy’s attack on Ethiopia brought this to a close, there attack on Albania ended any hope.
Talks with the Soviet Union where stalled as the Poles would not let the Soviets cross there border to attack the Germans (the Poles and Soviets had only recently been at war with each other) and in the end talks where to slow and the Soviets signed a deal with the Germans.
In the end, after 20 years of talks, deals and trying to form a grand alliance to combat Germany ... Poland was all what left. The French hoped they would hold out at least 6 months to give the French and British time to mobilise fully ... this never happened.
The Belgium’s left the alliance in the early 30s and declared neutrality, which screwed up French war plans a tad
War Plans
There was several plans the French High Command came up with:
The 3 plans were:
To move up to the Albert Canal, in Belgium, dig in and await the German attack. The Canal proving to be a tough nut to cross.
This plan would require the Belgium’s to invite the French (and the British) into Belgium.
This didn’t happen.
E Plan – To defend a line along the River Scheldt, (called Escaut in French) through Ghent to Antwerp. This plan was favoured by the French military as easier to defend because of the River
D Plan – To defend a line from the French border, along the Meuse River to Namur, then along the Dyle River to Antwerp. (the Dyle being less of an obstacle then the Scheldt, but gave the possibility of linking up with the Belgiums as they fell back from the Albert Canal)
D- Plan was the option which was in the end taken, it was slightly modified, The French 7th Army advancing on left of the allied forces would swing north and join up with the Dutch in southern Holland.
Any of these plans however left a dangerously large gap between the Maginot Line and the main allied force.
Covering this gap was the French 2nd Army, from what ive read most of its units where grade “B” reserve divisions – reservists and old men. The best units this army had, the mobile cavalry divisions, were sent forward, into the Ardennes to slow any German forces heading there way so that the men of 2nd army could have longer to prepare and dig in.
Commanders
From what ive read so far, there was far too much in fighting and distrust of each other for the chain of command to effective.
Eg tussling for the top spot
On top of that we have for example the commander of 2nd army being too complacent about his army and himself … not wanting to make a fuss.
The guy who was put in overall command of 1st, 7th, 9th Armies and the BEF not being able to communicate probably, not sending orders etc
Where am up to know, it states that the BEF and the Belgium troops went for 2 days without orders as this commander was unable to think what to do.
The British liaison office at this command post states he saw the French commanders crying and unable to work effectively.
It seems in the end, General Ironside had to be sent over to sort this command out and straighten things up.
Havnt finished this section of the book so there is probably a lot more to go on the commanders (all levels) actions.
Other
As most are aware of, French military doctrine at the time, which was improving though, stated that the tanks where to support the infantry and so there was not a great deal of them together to act as a tank brigade or division to strike back.
When this was done, De Gaulle assembled a tank force to counterattack, the lack of training for co-operation etc led them to defeat after they inflicted some damage.
The French command was also weary of mining the Rhine, striking bridges etc in Germany or the bombing of the German Industrial centre as it may cause a backlash upon them. Thus they hindered any attacks which could have been made to give the allies a better chance via these bombings.
There was a lot of infighting, pre war and during the early years between the British and the French. Distrust, separate agendas etc for example, the French where connived the British where waiting for the first chance they could to run off to the channel ports and evac.
When they were informed that British troops were going to pull out of southern Norway, the French kicked up a fuss and put this off to the defeatist … running off to the nearest port and home attitude and begged the British to hold off for a while longer.
As anyone got any information which could be added to the above sections to improve them etc, more info on tactics, strategy, commanders etc please post and add them.
The What If
After the ‘history lesson’ I think this brings us to the possible ‘What If’s’
If the French had been able to form a ‘Grand Alliance’ would have the war ended sooner? Would have Germany trounced all over them at any rate?
Would have better commanders and the possible strict use of the E plan (more of a defence of the French border then attempt to save as much of Belgium as possible plan) helped any better?
With Manstein devising a plan to go through the Ardennes and behind the French, Belgium and British positions … would have better commanders, strategy, tactics etc have been able to stop the Germans anyway?
Would have a man in charge of 2nd Army who would have been after more equipment, trained his troopers more, got them to prepare more etc have been able to stop the Panzer divisions?
Would have mining the Rhine and bombing the Rhineland have helped early war to slow the Germans down?
Or the more important question,
Was France in 1940 saveable?