enigma
08-17-2006, 02:21 PM
Again, another great post by Jason C on the Battlefront fourms.
He explains the roles of the British Crusier and Infantry tank here pretty well, some of us may already know this so this for yous's who didnt. :)
Part of the British (and commonwealth) tank force was contained in "Armour brigades" and "Armour divisions". These were conceived as independent tank led forces, meant to operate as a mobile arm. They had supporting motorized infantry and artillery as in US armor divisions or German panzer divisions - though they stayed tank-heavy to about midwar, and in practice their tanks often operated pretty much on their own, in large bodies.
(They were also thought of as having guns optimized for fighting other tanks, with the MG thought of as the main weapon against infantry. A few howitzer tanks provided self propelled artillery support, effectively, including smoke). This was the use of tanks that the original theorists of the tank arm had advocated. Don't "tie us to the infantry", let us operate "at our own speed", keep the tanks "massed". There was a fair amount of "cavalry thinking" in all this. This was called "armour", as a branch of service.
The alternate use of tanks was to support infantry formations. The Brits left part of their tank force for that role. They used slower tanks for it, which they thought wouldn't keep up with the role envisioned for the armour. These tended to be quite thickly armored, because they were originally intended to do things like duel pillboxes and "fight the infantry through" WW I style battlefields. Matildas and Valentines. These were called "infantry tanks". The branch of service that controlled them went by "tank" designations, rather than "armour" designations.
6th Royal Tank Regiment would mean a "tank" formation, about battalion size in US or German terms. Using infantry tanks, Matildas or Valentines, to support infantry divisions. 7th Armoured Brigade would mean an "armour" formation, brigade size. Using "cruiser" tanks (not that model, but in contrast to "infantry" tanks) - thinner armor and meant to be faster.
The cruiser models - A13 etc - were early versions of the armour idea. The Crusader was the first in the line of tanks meant to operate that way, that actually fit the bill. They also use Honeys (Stuarts for Americans) for this. In practice, massed thin armor on its own proved highly vulnerable to German combined arms. They found it hard to deal with gun fronts, for example. On occasion, whole tank brigades were shot to rags in a single afternoon, trying to attack positions that should have been blanketed with artillery not charged with thin tanks.
The "armour" side thought of themselves as by far the more prestigious, modern, theoretically sound, and forward looking. It also usually lost, sometimes horribly, against anything but Italians. The "tank" side won most of its battles. Thick armor and real combined arms cooperation proved more important than the "armour" theorists had thought, and speed was no more a substitute for armor on land, than it was for battlecruisers at Jutland.
In the late war, the armour forces had Shermans, a distinct improvement. And they got much better at combined arms coordination. (Though some cases like Goodwood, they still managed to screw it up). The tank units had Churchills and such. The armour branch was more successful then - which is not to say the tanks weren't, just that the armour went from disfunctional to functional after midwar.
He explains the roles of the British Crusier and Infantry tank here pretty well, some of us may already know this so this for yous's who didnt. :)
Part of the British (and commonwealth) tank force was contained in "Armour brigades" and "Armour divisions". These were conceived as independent tank led forces, meant to operate as a mobile arm. They had supporting motorized infantry and artillery as in US armor divisions or German panzer divisions - though they stayed tank-heavy to about midwar, and in practice their tanks often operated pretty much on their own, in large bodies.
(They were also thought of as having guns optimized for fighting other tanks, with the MG thought of as the main weapon against infantry. A few howitzer tanks provided self propelled artillery support, effectively, including smoke). This was the use of tanks that the original theorists of the tank arm had advocated. Don't "tie us to the infantry", let us operate "at our own speed", keep the tanks "massed". There was a fair amount of "cavalry thinking" in all this. This was called "armour", as a branch of service.
The alternate use of tanks was to support infantry formations. The Brits left part of their tank force for that role. They used slower tanks for it, which they thought wouldn't keep up with the role envisioned for the armour. These tended to be quite thickly armored, because they were originally intended to do things like duel pillboxes and "fight the infantry through" WW I style battlefields. Matildas and Valentines. These were called "infantry tanks". The branch of service that controlled them went by "tank" designations, rather than "armour" designations.
6th Royal Tank Regiment would mean a "tank" formation, about battalion size in US or German terms. Using infantry tanks, Matildas or Valentines, to support infantry divisions. 7th Armoured Brigade would mean an "armour" formation, brigade size. Using "cruiser" tanks (not that model, but in contrast to "infantry" tanks) - thinner armor and meant to be faster.
The cruiser models - A13 etc - were early versions of the armour idea. The Crusader was the first in the line of tanks meant to operate that way, that actually fit the bill. They also use Honeys (Stuarts for Americans) for this. In practice, massed thin armor on its own proved highly vulnerable to German combined arms. They found it hard to deal with gun fronts, for example. On occasion, whole tank brigades were shot to rags in a single afternoon, trying to attack positions that should have been blanketed with artillery not charged with thin tanks.
The "armour" side thought of themselves as by far the more prestigious, modern, theoretically sound, and forward looking. It also usually lost, sometimes horribly, against anything but Italians. The "tank" side won most of its battles. Thick armor and real combined arms cooperation proved more important than the "armour" theorists had thought, and speed was no more a substitute for armor on land, than it was for battlecruisers at Jutland.
In the late war, the armour forces had Shermans, a distinct improvement. And they got much better at combined arms coordination. (Though some cases like Goodwood, they still managed to screw it up). The tank units had Churchills and such. The armour branch was more successful then - which is not to say the tanks weren't, just that the armour went from disfunctional to functional after midwar.